

## Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Family of Concepts

With its tenets embedded in Naval Power 21, Marine Corps Strategy 21, and Sea Power 21, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the capstone concept that guides how the Marine Corps will organize, deploy, employ, and sustain its forces today and in the future. Capitalizing on the Marine Corps' philosophy of maneuver warfare and its expeditionary heritage, EMW emphasizes strategically agile and tactically flexible Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) with the operational reach to project power directly against critical points in the littorals and beyond.

EMW prepares the Marine Corps to move beyond traditional "amphibious operations," in the narrow sense, toward "expeditionary warfare" with a broader range of operational capabilities, and organizational, deployment, employment, and sustainment methods. EMW builds upon, rather than amends, the previous conceptual and doctrinal work that the Marine Corps has developed. Consequently, it embraces Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA), Distributed Operations (DO), as well as the overarching transformational concept of Seabasing and other functional concepts. EMW preserves the MAGTF as the central organizational construct, while providing commanders guidance for improvement in the other integrating concepts of deployment, employment, and sustainment.



### OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

Operational Maneuver from the Sea applies the principles and philosophy of EMW to the sea space. In crafting OMFTS, the Marine Corps codified the many lessons of history regarding how command of the sea can create an operational advantage through a maneuver warfare approach. OMFTS focuses on the littoral region at the operational level of war. Operational maneuver is conducted with a reactive adversary in mind and is designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, at positional disadvantage or vulnerable to surprise. The ability to strike from the sea at the time and place of our choosing compels the enemy to defend the length of his coast. The capability provided by OMFTS forces the enemy to disperse the force throughout the littoral region and renders him vulnerable to defeat in detail. If the enemy fails to dissipate his combat power to guard against our capability and remains concentrated, then naval forces can maneuver opportunistically through the gaps in his defenses to strike at


critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities. OMFTS enables naval forces to redefine the battle space. By attacking from an unexpected or new direction, naval forces can have decisive impact on the enemy scheme of maneuver.

### SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER

Marine Corps forces have long provided a scalable, tailorable, and expeditionary combined-arms option, enabling joint commanders to deal with a wide range of contingencies. For decades, however, Marine power projection has included a deliberate buildup of combat power ashore. This buildup required the establishment of a force beachhead, with relatively fixed fire support, logistics, and command-and-control positions

located ashore. Only after naval forces fought ashore and established a beachhead would the MAGTF begin to focus its combat power on the joint force's operational objective. A combination of naval initiatives in advanced mobility, fires, and sustainment capabilities, leveraging substantially enhanced information connectivity, will enable future Marine forces to be employed in a dramatically different manner, making them an even more effective tool of national power.

STOM is a transformational tactical application of enduring naval capabilities for OMFTS that exploits each of the enhanced capabilities described by Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Enabled by persistent, responsive, and dynamic Sea Bases, forward deployed in international waters, naval forces executing STOM



Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

will be able to project MAGTFs directly to critical operational objectives located deep inland, dislocating our adversaries both in space and in time. STOM includes combined arms penetration and exploitation operations from over the horizon, by both air and surface means, with forces moving rapidly to operational objectives without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.

STOM provides the Navy-Marine Corps Team with an enhanced sea-based forcible entry capability, optimized to enable the introduction of follow-on Air Force, Army, and multinational forces. In combination with other joint forces, naval forces capable of operational maneuver and STOM can also provide the joint force commander with Operational Maneuver Elements, ideal for creating dilemmas for our adversary during sustained operations ashore. Because naval forces able to conduct STOM will be able to project power more swiftly than ever before, they will also be able to “kick down the door” that the enemy’s defense presents, and preclude him from effectively integrating his anti-access defenses as crises threaten.



## SEABASING

Seabasing is a national capability and the overarching transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining naval power and selected joint forces, which assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of distributed and networked forces operating globally from the sea. The concept unites our capabilities for projecting offensive power, defensive power, command and control, mobility and sustainment around the world. As detailed in the Navy-Marine Corps Concept Enhanced Networked Seabasing (ENS), Seabasing enables and integrates OMFTS and STOM by employing the sea base as a means to support naval fire and maneuver at sea, in the littorals, and beyond. This combination of operational and tactical combined-arms capability, which gives us the ability to attack laterally as well as in depth, confronts our adversary with an operational problem he cannot solve.

## **FUTURE SEA BASE**

The sea base is a scalable aggregation of distributed and networked platforms that provides for the assembly, equipping, support, and sustainment of offensive and defensive power-projection forces from the sea, without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The platforms composing the Sea Base are configured and tailored based on operational requirements and may include elements of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG), high-speed connectors (JHSS, JHSV, JMAC, and EFV), coalition and sister service ships, or other theater assets. The Sea Base will exploit the maneuver space provided by the sea to enable and conduct joint operations at a time and place of our choosing. A number of qualitative improvements distinguish the future Sea Base from our current capabilities. As described in ENS, they include:

### **Integrated Naval Power Projection**

Fully networked, forward-deployed naval forces and platforms will conduct integrated naval power projection. These forces will use the sea as a means of maneuver and enable a broad range of joint campaign operations. Sea-based operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and sustain all aspects of multi-dimensional naval power projection, from space to the ocean floor, from blue water to the littorals and beyond-without dependence on land bases within the JOA.

## **Network-Enabled C4ISR**

Under our Seabasing concept, naval expeditionary command and control (C2)-integrated into the joint C2 architecture-extends throughout the littorals, from seabed to space, and applies to forces operating at sea and from the sea. Command and control-systems will support naval forces from the point of departure to their objectives and throughout subsequent operations. These C2 systems will facilitate coordinated actions by dispersed forces and assets and enable decision-making at the lowest level to increase operational tempo. The sea-based command-and-control system, in concert with the overarching FORCEnet concept, will also support the functions of a joint task force headquarters.

### **Rapid Force Closure**

Another key tenet of Seabasing is that forces will close to the JOA by multi-dimensional means, including self-deployment and strategic air, surface, and commercial assets. Reflecting the forward deployment of sustainable, immediately employable, combat-ready forces, the initial naval response to a crisis will likely consist of the ESG and CSG. When ESGs and CSGs combine with a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Future Squadron, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), surface action groups, and the Combat Logistics Force, the resulting sea base will generate synergy among these elements



through the integration of their communication, fire-support, and logistics capabilities.

### **Phased At-Sea Arrival and Assembly**

As the MPF(F) Squadron moves to the objective area, the transformational capability resident within MPF (Future) platforms enables phased arrival and assembly. The ability to move directly to the sea base assures the rapid deployment of MEB-sized forces and selected joint forces in as few as 14 days, without the need for host nation facilities within the JOA. These forces will arrive at locations en route to the objective area via strategic lift and self-deployment, then move directly to the sea base using intra-theater assets, such as high-speed vessels and tilt-rotor aircraft. Supported on their way by networked command-and-control systems, which feature advanced collaborative planning and rehearsal technologies, these forces will arrive in the objective area ready for immediate employment.

### **Selective Offload**

Unlike current MPF Squadrons, prepositioning ships of the future sea base will be able to conduct a selective offload of specific equipment and supplies to tailor general-purpose

forces for specific missions. Regardless of whether the mission is a logistics-intensive humanitarian operation or a large-scale ship-to-objective maneuver in a major contingency, selective offload will facilitate the employment of an optimized force package.

### **Persistence and Sustainment**

The traditional naval qualities of persistence and sustainment-enhanced by advanced force-wide networks—underpin the staying power and flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay on-station, where they are needed, for extended periods of time. Regional support bases sustain the sea base via strategic logistics pipelines from the United States and elsewhere. The at-sea maneuverability of the sea base, coupled with advanced underway replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness over time.

### **Reconstitution at Sea**

Finally, reconstitution at sea enables the rapid reemployment of a fully capable naval force for subsequent operations. Once recovered at the sea base, onboard logistics capabilities will allow MAGTFs to replace, re-equip, and re-supply personnel and equipment in their constituent units.

While being replenished, these forces can simultaneously be task-organized for new missions, and operationally repositioned and redirected toward new objectives in the area of operations. At-sea reconstitution optimizes MAGTF employment as an Operational Maneuver Element by the JFC. Seabasing will provide our nation with unprecedented versatility and flexibility to exploit the freedom of the high seas, relatively unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for rapid deployment and immediate employment. It will be a key to national success in this new international security environment, and to our ability to meet and defeat our adversaries in the 21st century.

### **SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE**

When possible and advantageous, MAGTF commanders will exploit sea-based capabilities. When necessary or more efficient, they will utilize land-based operations, and consequently MAGTFs must retain the capability to sustain operations from land bases. Throughout this century, Marine forces have been called upon to operate alongside Army and allied forces in sustained joint campaigns. MAGTF participation in Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA) will be every bit as likely in the 21st century. However, the nature of such participation will be different. SOA envisions the MAGTF remaining a general purpose force, but one capable of executing a series of precise, focused combat actions rath-

er than primarily participating in continuous, methodical ground operations. By capitalizing on its unique sea-based character, the MAGTF not only remains the nation's premier forcible entry force, but establishes itself as the force of choice for decisive operations, as well. Versatility in basing options ensures that Marines will be capable of mounting sustainable operations in "any clime or place."

### **DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS**

The anticipated adaptive capability of future enemies present new operational challenges to the Navy-Marine Corps Team. In response, the emerging naval concept for Distributed Operations (DO) is intended to equip Joint Force Commanders with an additive capability to more accurately resolve and immediately respond to ambiguity, while creating confusion for our adversaries. DO are characterized by the ability to physically disperse networked squad-to battalion-sized units over a battlespace extended in both depth and breadth. Contributing to greater situational awareness, capable of precisely directing overwhelming firepower, and readily concentrating to exploit opportunities, Marine forces conducting DO will present a complex puzzle to the adversary and create a competitive advantage for joint warriors.

Like all concepts, DO serves to guide the concentrated development of a range of capabilities. Most obvious, perhaps, are those that will be used to accelerate the speed and quality of networked command and control, collect and dissemi-

nate multi-source information, provide mobility and sustainment, and routinely direct precision fires—each around the clock, and in all weather.

More challenging and most critical, however, are those capabilities that will prepare our junior leaders to thrive on a decentralized battlefield. DO requires robust situational awareness, autonomy, and increased freedom of action at lower tactical levels, enabling subordinate commanders to compress decision cycles, seize the initiative, and exploit fleeting opportunities. Training for DO will place a premium on leadership and decision-making at every level of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and will demand extensive education, wargaming, and combat simulation investments.

Concentrated on the forward-deployed Expeditionary Strike Group and its organic Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or MEU (SOC), in the near term, the current concept is deliberately focused on its application by naval forces to enable early joint operations. As it continues to evolve, our concept for DO will substantially enhance the capacity of Naval Expeditionary Forces to meet critical capability gaps of the Combatant Commanders across the range of military operations. Marine forces conducting DO will enable actionable intelligence, shape the battlespace or screen for other forces, and direct precise joint fires. DO will add to our current competencies, rather than replace them, by adding selected advanced command-and-control (C2) and Intelligence, Sur-

veillance, Reconnaissance systems to our equipment, injecting rigorous training that infuses and exploits a “patrolling” mindset, and focusing on the abilities of our small unit leaders.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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Information Operations (IO) at all levels must be carefully planned and fully integrated. The Marine Corps needs to provide Marine Forces to Combatant Commanders that are manned, trained, and equipped with the means to directly and indirectly affect the behavior of potential and/or realized adversaries prior to, during, and following decisive military actions. Meeting this need requires Marine Forces Component Commands and subordinate MAGTFs capable of conducting integrated IO; postured to support and/or conduct actions to influence potential and/or realized adversary information, information systems, and decision-making, while simultaneously assuring, protecting, and defending similar, Marine Forces capabilities. Without IO capable Marine Forces – often, forward deployed and first on scene – the Combatant Commander’s requirement to secure, shape, and ultimately condition the operational environment will never be fully met. IO is an integrating concept that facilitates the warfighting functions of command and control, fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, and force protection.

In order to establish the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capability of the MAGTF and increase the tactical

interoperability of the USMC and SOF, the Marine Corps has undertaken the development of a Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) at each MEF to provide a Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) to each Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) during a deployment cycle. TPTs provide PSYOP dissemination in support of operations conducted by conventional and SOF units. Core requirements include:

- (1) Direct and expeditionary support of seven TPTs to be deployed with Marine Expeditionary Units and operating forces to communicate with foreign target audiences and,
- (2) USMC PSYOP equipment, instrumental in the development and dissemination of PSYOP products. Unique equipment assets include System of modular amplifiers/speakers forming loudspeakers.

The USMC concept of a TPT is a four-person team commanded by a Captain. The TPT's primary purpose is to integrate and execute tactical PSYOP into the supported commander's operation. The TPT also advises the commander and staff on the psychological effects of their operations on the target audience in their AO, as well as the effects of propaganda, and answer all PSYOP-related questions. The TPT can conduct face-to-face, communication, loudspeaker operations, and dissemination of approved audio, audiovisual, and printed products. They are instrumental in the gathering of PSYOP-relevant information, conducting town

or area assessments, observing impact indicators, and gathering pre-testing and post-testing data. TPTs often play a role in establishing rapport with foreign audiences and identifying key communicators that can be used to achieve US national objectives. Tactical PSYOP can increase the supported unit commander's ability to operate on the battlefield by reducing or minimizing civilian interference. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) FY-04, signed by the SECDEF 15 May 2002 clearly emphasized the intent to transform today's Defense establishment and Military departments/services. This included tasking USSOCOM with creating a Strategic PSYOP Force while enhancing Joint PSYOP forces structure and modernizing joint PSYOP capabilities. All services were directed to participate in the joint force structure enhancements.

IO is not simply another arrow in the MAGTF commander's quiver, but is a broad-based integrative approach that makes the bow stronger. This distinction is key to our belief that IO does not, and will not, replace any of the time-tested warfighting functions rather, it will enable each of them. Thus, the focus of Marine Corps IO will be upon the information-oriented activities that will best support the tailored application of combat power and the joint force commander's needs. IO, whether shaping the battlespace to deter conflict or enabling decisive maneuver, must be recognized as an essential and potentially dominant activity.